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LOTUS v. BORLAND: CONFUSION WITHIN THE
COMPUTER INDUSTRY "AFFIRMED" BY
THE SUPREME COURT
I. INTRODUCTION
Computer technology has developed at an exponential rate. In a similar
fashion, evolving computer companies fiercely compete for the consumer mar-
ket. Most computer companies continue to offer improved variations on the
same computer program ideas. Naturally, courts cannot decide cases quickly
enough to give attorneys an accurate indication as to what portions of a com-
puter program are copyrightable. Last year, the United States Supreme Court
decision of Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc.' did not
help draw such a line. In fact, the Court's opinion served to confuse the com-
puter industry. On January 16, 1996, the Supreme Court, split 4-4, issued a one
sentence opinion affirming the First Circuit decision. As a result of the 4-4
vote, the circuits remain split.
There are primarily two types of computer programs: operating system
programs and application programs.2 Furthermore, each computer program
consists of primarily three levels.3 The first and lowest level consists of the
machine language which is written in "bits."4 The next level is the "intermedi-
ate" level which consists of the object code.5 Finally, the highest level is the
"source code" which consists of the written program language such as
FORTAN, COBOL or BASIC.6 As literal expressions, these levels of a com-
puter program are copyrightable.7 However, the difficulty arises in determining
the copyrightability of the non-literal portions of computer programs.
In Lotus v. Borland,' the First Circuit made such a determination. This
case note will first describe the companies and computer programs at issue and
provide a time line of events prior to the suit. Next, it will provide a brief ex-
1. 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996), affg 49 F.3d 807 (lst Cir. 1995).
2. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 43 (D. Mass. 1990) [hereinafter
Paperback]. In particular, operating systems include programs such as DOS, XENIX and OS/2, which essen-
tially control the basic functions of the computer. See id. However, application programs merely permit a user
to perform particular functions. See id.
3. See id. at 43-44.
4. See id. at 43.
5. See id. at 44. Today, most computer programmers do not write programs using the object code; rath-
er, they write programs utilizing the source code. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id. at 45. See also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d
Cir. 1983).
8. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Lotus].
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planation of copyright law. It will then analyze the First Circuit's decision.
Finally, it will describe how computer lawyers have sought to protect their
clients in light of the Supreme Court's decision.
I. THE COMPANIES AND THEIR PRODUCTS
Lotus Development Corporation created the spreadsheet computer program
"Lotus 1-2-3." Like any other computer program, it would be useless without
some way for the user to control it. Lotus' founder, Mitchell Kapor, initially
conceived of a way in which a computer user could efficiently operate Lotus I-
2-3; the conception was Lotus 1-2-3's "menu command hierarchy.""0 The
menu command hierarchy Kapor envisioned consisted of numerous "com-
mands."'1 Each command was a word which described to the software user the
particular operation the computer could perform.'" All the commands were
then to be arranged in a series of menus and submenus. 3 Ultimately, after
much time and effort, Kapor and a team under his direction developed Lotus 1-
2-3's menu command hierarchy. 4 Essentially, they designed it in a way they
felt was the easiest for the ultimate user to understand.' 5
Lotus even allowed the user to create "macros," which is a way for the
user to assign several menu commands to a single keystroke. 6 A macro pro-
vides a way for a user to perform repetitive tasks almost effortlessly. In an
effort to protect its creation, Lotus copyrighted the program.'" This copyright
included the series of menu commands. Naturally, the easier Lotus 1-2-3 was
to operate, the more likely it would be popular with consumers.
9. See id. at 809.
10. See Petitioner's Brief at 9, Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996) (No. 94-
2003).
11. See id.
12. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 203, 206 (D. Mass 1992) [hereinafter
Borland I1].
13. See Petitioner's Brief at 5-6, Lotus (No. 94-2003). Specifically, Lotus claims:
The menus appear in variable series designed by the authors of 1-2-3 to respond to users' choices
from previous menus, branching out from the first or "main" menu in what often is called a "menu
tree." It is the copyrightability of the overall combination of words and menus in the 1-2-3 menu
command hierarchy, viewed as a whole, and not any individual menu command such as "COPY" or
"PRINT," viewed in isolation, that is at issue in this case.
Id. (citations omitted).
14. See id. at 9.
15. See id. Specifically, "[tjhe menu commands reflected Kapor's subsequent attempt to express those
capabilities to users, in full words 'that would intelligently convey to the user the purpose of each com-
mand.'" Id. Moreover, in creating Lotus 1-2-3's menu command hierarchy, "Kapor and his team spent hun-
dreds of hours over a period of many months considering (and discarding) dozens of organizations of the
menu tree, and refining the choice of each word in the menus and the order of those words within each
menu." Id. Ultimately, the final version consisted of a menu command hierarchy which Kapor described as
one which "'was based largely on my intuition and subjective judgment... trying as best I could to imagine
myself in the role of a typical user."' Id. at 9-10 (alteration in original).
16. See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 809.
17. See id. at 809-10.
18. See Petitioner's Brief at 2, Lotus (No. 94-2003).
19. See id.
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After Lotus 1-2-3 swept the market, Borland International, Inc. released its
spreadsheet program "Quattro. ''"s Prior to its release, Borland engineers had
spent almost three years developing Quattro so it would have a menu structure
identical to that of Lotus 1-2-3' Borland specifically wanted to make Quattro
"compatible with Lotus 1-2-3 so that spreadsheet users who where already
familiar with Lotus 1-2-3 would be able to switch to the Borland programs
without having to learn new commands or rewrite their Lotus macros." The
ultimate versions of Quattro did contain Lotus 1-2-3's menu command hierar-
chy r
III. THE Surf
A. Decisions Up To and Including The Supreme Court's Decision
Prior to its suit with Borland, Lotus was involved in a suit with another
computer company, Paperback Software International, who produced the spread-
sheet program "V-P Planner."2 In Paperback, Lotus claimed that V-P Planner
infringed upon Lotus 1-2-3 in that it contained substantially similar elementsOra
On June 28, 1990, "a district court held the Lotus 1-2-3's 'menu structure,
taken as a whole-including the choice of command terms [and] the structure
and order of those terms,' was protected expression covered by Lotus's copy-
rights.'
The next day, on June 29, 1990, Borland filed a declaratory judgment
action against Lotus in the Northern District of California seeking a declaration
of non-infringement v Lotus filed suit against Borland in the District of Mas-
sachusetts on July 2, 199 0.Y Ultimately, on September 10, 1990, Borland's
suit was dismissed in favor of Lotus' suit.29
Subsequently, the district court denied both companies' motions for sum-
mary judgment.30 However, from invitation of the district court both sides re-
newed their motions.3 In its motion, Borland claimed the Lotus 1-2-3 menus
20. See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 810.
21. See id.
22. Id. In both of the spreadsheet programs, Quattro and Quattro Pro, Borland achieved this compatibili-
ty by allowing Quattro computer users to use a "Lotus Emulation Interface.' See id By activating the inter-
face, the computer screen would display the Lotus menu commands. See id. Additionally, the interface would
also contain additional menu commands not available for Lotus 1-2-3. See id.
23. See id. It should be noted that Borland had great success after marketing Quattro and Quattro Pro.
Respondent's Brief at 11, Lotus (No. 94-2003). Specifically, Borland boasted that "Quattro Pro was first intro-
duced in 1989 and won every major award for spreadsheet excellence given in the software industry.' Id.
Furthermore, Borland contended, "Quattro Pro invariably ranked higher than [Lotus] 1-2-3 in head-to-head
reviews and user comparisons, including those conducted by Lotus." Id.
24. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
25. See id. at 42.




30. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 788 F. Supp 78, 81 (D. Mass 1992) [hereinafter Borland
1.31. See Ed. at 82. The district court said it would allow the parties to "focus their arguments more pre-
1997]
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were uncopyrightable as a matter of law and that no reasonable jury could find
such similarity between Quattro and Lotus 1-2-3.32 Lotus, on the other hand,
alleged that Borland infringed on Lotus' copyright.33 Ultimately, the district
court denied Borland's motion and granted Lotus' motion in part." The district
court essentially concluded that Borland, as a matter of law, infringed on Lotus'
copyright." However, the district court denied Lotus' motion in part, reasoning
that the scope of relief hinged on a jury's determination of several factual is-
sues.
36
Following the district court's decision, Borland appealed.37 The First Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals reviewed only the issue of whether Lotus' menu com-
mand hierarchy constituted copyrightable subject matter.8 The First Circuit
reversed the district court by holding Lotus 1-2-3's menu command hierarchy
was uncopyrightable subject matter.39 Lotus then petitioned the Supreme Court
for certiorari.' The Court granted certiorari and heard oral arguments.4 With
the computer industry watching, the Court issued a one sentence per curiam
opinion holding that "[tihe judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit is affinmed by an equally divided Court."'42
B. Effect of the Court's Decision
The split vote by the Supreme Court has left the computer copyright law
in disarray. This confusion can be explained by investigating the precedential
effect of the Court's decision. In Durant v. Essex Co.,43 the Court held that an
equally divided Supreme Court merely ends the process of direct review and the
judgment below remains in force." Therefore, such "affirmance" settles no
cisely." Id.
32. Lotus, 49 F.3d at 810.
33. See id. In particular, Lotus asserted Borland had "copied expressive elements of the 1-2-3 interface,
including 'menu commands,' 'menu structure,' 'long prompts,' and 'keystroke sequences."' Borland If, 799
F.Supp. at 205.
34. See Borland II, 799 F. Supp. at 205.
35. See id. at 223. The district court concluded Borland infringed on Lotus' copyright because:
(1) the extent of copying of the "menu commands" and "menu structure"... is not genuinely disput-
ed in this case, (2) the extent to which the copied elements of the "menu commands" and "menu
structure" contain expressive aspects separable from the functions of the "menu commands" and




37. See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 812.
38. See id. at 809.
39. See id. at 819.
40. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 39 (1995).
41. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 561 (1995).
42. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 804, 805 (1996). Justice Stevens took no part in
the consideration or decision of the case. See id.
43. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 107 (1868).
44. See id. at 112, Specifically, the Court stated:
If the judges are divided, the reversal cannot be had, for no order can be made. The judgment of the
court below, therefore, stands in full force. It is, indeed, the settled practice in such case to enter a
judgment of affirmance; but this is only the most convenient mode of expressing the fact that the
cause is finally disposed of in conformity with the action of the court below, and that court can pro-
ceed to enforce its judgment. The legal effect would be the same if the appeal, or writ of error, were
4
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issue of law and is not entitled to precedential value. Similar to Durant, it is
clear that the Supreme Court's decision in Lotus, which was split 4-4, has no
precedential effect. Consequently, the First Circuit decision remains mandatory
authority within the First Circuit and only persuasive authority in the other 12
Districts.
To further add to the confusion, it is clear that by granting certiorari, the
Supreme Court found the issue to be important. It seems almost inevitable that
the Court will make a definitive ruling in the future. Therefore, the First
Circuit's decision offers little guidance for an attorney who seeks long term
solutions to computer copyrightability problems. Equally confusing, and impor-
tant to this paper, is the way the First Circuit arrives at its holding that Lotus'
menu command hierarchy is uncopyrightable.
IV. COPYRIGHT LAW
To fully understand the First Circuit's decision, one must understand some
of the basic concepts related to copyright law. Copyright law originates from
Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution. It says Congress has the
power "[tlo promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries."'4s
A. The Expression and Idea Dichotomy
One important aspect of copyright law is the distinction between an ex-
pression of an idea and the idea itself. While the former is copyrightable, the
latter is not.' The classic case involving this expression/idea distinction is
Baker v. Selden.47 In Baker, the plaintiff, Selden, wrote and copyrighted a
book which explained a peculiar way of book-keeping.' Included within the
book was an explanation of the accounting system, as well as forms and ta-
dismissed.
Id. See also Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
46. Another crucial principle in determining whether a work is copyrightable is the distinction between
utilitarian and non-utilitarian aspect of the work. This principle is demonstrated in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S.
201 (1954). In Mazer, the plaintiff held a copyright for a sculpture in the form of a human figure. See id. at
202. Subsequently, the plaintiff mass-produced the statuettes as lamp bases. See id. at 203. Without authoriza-
tion, the defendants copied the statuettes, embodied them in lamps and sold them. See id. Later, the plaintiffs
sued, claiming the defendants infringed on a valid copyright. See id. at 203-04.
In response, the defendants claimed that the lamps were purely utilitarian objects; thus, they were not
copyrightable. See id. at 205-06. The defendants also argued that because the plaintiff could have received
patent protection, the plaintiff should not receive copyright protection. See id. at 215. The Court then recited
the development of copyright legislation. See id. at 208. Ultimately, the Court held that although the lamps
were functional and clearly utilitarian, they also deserve copyright protection. See id. at 219.
This principle was only briefly discussed in Lotus. The court essentially brushed this possible argu-
ment aside, just as it did for the idealexpression distinction, reasoning that it did not apply because the menu
command hierarchy represents a "method of operation." See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 817.
47. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
48. See id. at 100.
1997]
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bles.49 Selden alleged that Baker infringed on his copyright by developing a
system which was similar to Selden's; however, Baker's system used a different
arrangement of columns and different headings." The Court reasoned that
while the description of the accounting system was entitled to the benefit of
copyright as art, the actual accounting system was not, as it represented only an
idea." Ultimately, the Court held that Selden's copyright did not give him an
exclusive right to the accounting system 2
B. The Doctrine of Merger
In some instances, distinguishing between the expression of an idea and
the idea itself becomes difficult. Consequently, the doctrine of merger has
evolved. 53 The First Circuit Court of Appeals explained this doctrine in
Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co.5' In Morrissey, the plaintiff held a copy-
right to a set of rules for a contest of the "sweepstakes" type.5 The plaintiff
sued for copyright infringement after Proctor & Gamble copied one of the con-
test rules.56 The appellate court held that the rules of the contest were not
copyrightable.' Specifically, the court said:
When the uncopyrightable subject matter is very narrow, so that "the topic
necessarily requires,".. . if not only one form of expression, at best only
a limited number, to permit copyrighting would mean that a party or
parties, by copyrighting a mere handful of forms, could exhaust all possi-
bilities of future use of the substance. In such circumstances it does not
seem accurate to say that any particular form of expression comes from
the subject matter. However, it is necessary to say that the subject matter
would be appropriated by permitting the copyrighting of its expression.58
Consequently, when the expression of an idea is so closely linked to the idea
itself and there is only a limited number of forms of expression, the expression
merges with the idea, making it uncopyrightable.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 104-05.
52. See id. at 107.
53. Moreover, the doctrine of merger also applies when the utility and non-utility are inseparable.
54. 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967).
55. See id. at 676.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 678.
58. Id. at 678-79.
[Vol. 32:633
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C. Federal Copyright Law
Congress enacted the most recent copyright law in 1976.!, Subsequently,
Congress responded to recommendations of the National Commission of New
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) and included the defini-
tion of computer programs.' Computer programs are defined as "a set of state-
ments or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to
bring about a certain result."' Moreover, Congress also amended section 117
to specifically include the copyrightability of computer programs.62 In its re-
port, CONTU never suggests that copyright protection be limited to the literal
code; rather, it addresses the dichotomy between idea and expression.'
CONTU's report suggests that courts are better able to distinguish between
expression and idea rather than adopt a per se rule in copyright cases.'
59. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (1994). The subject matter of copyright is covered in section 102. It
reads:
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed
in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be per-
ceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or de-
vice. Works of authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion picture and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings; and
(8) architectural works.
(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, proce-
dure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.
17 U.S.C. § 102.
60. See Whelan Assoc's v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1240-41 (3d Cir. 1986).
61. 17 U.S.C § 101.
62. See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1241. Section 117 now reads:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement for the owner of a copy
of a computer program to make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that com-
puter program provided:
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the utilization of the
computer program in conjunction with a machine and that it is used in no other manner, or
(2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and that all archival copies
are destroyed in the event that continued possession of the computer program should cease to be
rightful.
Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provisions of this section may be leased, sold,
or otherwise transferred, along with the copy from which such copies were prepared, only as part of
the lease, sale, or other transfer of all rights in the program. Adaptations so prepared may be trans-
ferred only with the authorization of the copyright owner.
17 U.S.C. § 117.
63. See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1241.
64. See id.
7
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D. The Problems Associated with Copyrighting Computer Programs
Although section 102 covers copyright protection of computer programs, it
is clear that there exists some difficulty in classifying the gambit of computer
program elements. One element includes the written code of the computer.' It
represents the computer programmer's written work.' Almost like words in a
book, it clearly can be protected by copyright.67 However, the other portions of
the computer program are not as easily categorized as copyrightable. For exam-
ple, one portion of a computer program embodies the entire function of the
program, like a word processor which enables a user to type letters or write
papers. Clearly, this level of the computer programs only represents an idea,
undeserving of copyright protection." The trouble with copyright protection
for computer programs consists of the elements between the computer code and
the idea behind the computer program. Such elements include the program's
"screen output," or in the case of Lotus, the "user interface." These elements
require a much more in-depth analysis to determine whether they should be
offered copyright protection. Consequently, courts have developed several tests
to provide such analysis.
E. Case Law Prior to the First Circuit's Decision
The various judicial tests have developed in light of Congress' failure to
provide much guidance concerning the copyrightability of non-literal elements
of computer programs. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals was one of the first
courts to develop such a test in Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laborato-
ry.69 Whelan involved the alleged copyright infringement of the computer pro-
gram Dentalab which was used in a dental laboratory.0 Ultimately, the trial
court concluded that the defendant's competing computer program Dentacom
infringed on the copyright of Dentalab.7" On appeal, the defendant argued that
the structure of the computer program consisted of the idea of the program;
thus, it cannot be afforded copyright protection.' The appellate court, howev-
er, disagreed holding that a computer program's structure, a non-literal element
of the computer program, entails part of its expression.'
Initially, the Whelan court briefly described the technical background be-
hind computer programs.74 The court concluded the coding process, a literal
65. See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text.
68. See Borland II, 799 F. Supp. at 217.
69. 797 F.2d 1222, 1241 (3d Cir. 1986).
70. See id. at 1226.
71. See id. at 1228.
72. See id. at 1235.
73. See id. at 1239-40.
74. See id. at 1229-31.
[Vol. 32:633
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element of the computer program, consisted of a small part of programming.75
The court also analyzed section 102 and its legislative history.76 The appellate
court held that copyright protection extends beyond the literal computer code.7
Ultimately, the court concluded that there was enough evidence for the trial
court to find that the computer programs were substantially similar to each
other.7
Several years later, the Second Circuit examined the same issue in Com-
puter Associates International, Inc. v. Altai. 79 The Altai court reasoned that the
Whelan court's opinion was based on "outdated appreciation of computer sci-
ence." Specifically, the Altai court determined that the Whelan decision relied
"too heavily on metaphysical distinctions" and not enough on practical consid-
erations.8 ' Ultimately, the Second Circuit devised a three-step procedure to
determine if the non-literal elements of competing computer programs are sub-
stantially similar.'
The test the Altai court used is known as the "abstractions" test." In the
first step of the "abstractions" test within the context of computer programs, the
abstraction step, a court should dissect the computer program and then isolate
each level of abstraction.84 This procedure is similar to reverse engineering in
that the court must retrace and map each of the computer programmer's steps in
designing the computer program.85 Consequently, the court must classify sever-
al levels of abstraction which range from the computer source code to an articu-
lation of the program's ultimate function.86
In the second step, the filtration step, a court filters the different levels of
abstraction to separate the protectable expressions from non-protectable ones.'
Essentially, a court must determine why the computer programmer inserted that
particular level of abstraction at that level.8 If the court determines that the
75. See id. at 1231.
76. See id. at 1233-34.
77. See id. at 1248.
78. See id. The court discussed the relevant evidence showing substantial similarity between Dentalab
and Dentacom. See id. at 1242-48. The court said:
Because all steps of a computer program are not of equal importance, the relevant inquiry cannot
therefore be the purely mechanical one of whether most of the programs' steps are similar. Rather,
because we are concerned with the overall similarities between the programs, we must ask whether
the most significant steps of the programs are similar.
Id. at 1246.
79. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
80. Id. at 706.
81. Id. The court also said that its decision merely applies the traditional analysis of copyright to the
new technology of computer programs. See id. Moreover, the court recognized the disparaging difference be-
tween the speed of computer technology advancement and the speed at with courts decide cases. See id.
82. See id. at 706-12.
83. See id. Judge Learned Hand created the "abstractions" test for separating idea from expression under
copyright law. See id. at 706 (citing Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930)).
See also Autoskill v. National Educ. Support Sys., 994 F.2d 1476, 1491 (10th Cir. 1993).
84. See Altai, 982 F.2d at 706.
85. See id. at 707.
86. See id.
87. See id. at 707-10.
88. See id. at 707.
1997]
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level of abstraction was included because it was an "idea" or was dictated by
efficiency considerations and, thus, merely incidental to the idea, then it is
unprotectable expression. 9 Similarly, if the level of abstraction was inserted
because of "factors external to the program itself; or taken from public do-
main," it is also unprotectable.?
Finally, in the comparison step, a court must determine whether the alleged
infringer copied any of the protectable levels of abstraction.9 Here the court
uses a substantial similarity inquiry between the protectable levels of abstraction
of the copyrighted program and that of the alleged infringer's program.' Only
after applying the three step test can a court then adequately determine whether
a computer program's non-literal elements have been copied by another pro-
grammer.
V. THE FIRST CIRCurr's DECISION
In Lotus, the First Circuit began its opinion by describing the menu com-
mand hierarchy, the companies, and the facts leading up to the review.' 3 The
court then described the sole issue in the case: whether Lotus 1-2-3's menu
command hierarchy is uncopyrightable as a system, method of operation, pro-
cess, or procedure making it unprotected by federal copyright statute section
102(b).94
The Lotus court then described the test that a plaintiff must satisfy in order
to prove copyright infringement.95 It specifically discussed the two prong test
developed in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.9" The
court said that "a plaintiff must prove '(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and
(2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.""7 It went
on to describe that in order for a plaintiff to satisfy Feist's first prong, it must
89. See id. In this step, the Second Circuit reasoned that under traditional copyright concepts expressions
which were merely incidental to the idea being expressed, merge with the underlying idea. See id. (citing
Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967)). Furthermore, the court stated
several reasons why the merger doctrine applied to computer programs as it did to other copyrightable materi-
als. First, it determined that CONTU recognized the doctrine's applicability to computer programs. See id. at
708. It also recognized that the more computer programmers strive to create the most efficient programs, the
closer such designs approximate the idea or process embodied in the structure. See id. Finally, it considered
"a program's essentially utilitarian nature and competitive forces that exist in the software marketplace." Id.
90. Id. at 707. With respect to external factors, the court reasoned that programmers do not have the
absolute freedom of design choice. See id. at 709. Specifically, programmers choices are limited "by extrinsic
considerations such as (1) mechanical specifications of the computer,... (2) compatibility requirements of
other programs with which a program is designed to operate in conjunction; (3) computer manufacturers'
design standards; (4) demands of the industry; ... and (5) widely accepted programming practices within the
computer industry." Id. at 709-10.
91. See id. at 710-12. The court refers to the remaining protectable expression left over after filtration
and comparison as the "golden nugget." See id. at 710.
92. See id.
93. See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 809-12.
94. See id. at 812.
95. See id. at 813.
96. 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
97. Lotus, 49 F.3d at 813 (quoting Feist, 499 U.S. at 361).
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prove that the work as a whole is original and that it complied with applicable
statutory formalities." Moreover, having a certificate of copyright registration
shifts the burden of proof to the defendant as it "'constitutes prima facia evi-
dence of copyrightability."' While the First Circuit briefly described how one
must satisfy Feist's second prong, it only had to determine whether Lotus'
menu command hierarchy was copyrightable because Borland conceded that
Lotus had a valid copyright."° The court recognized that the outcome of most
copyright infringement cases hinges on whether there exists actual infringe-
ment. '0 Consequently, it noted that earlier copyright infringement cases pro-
vided little value in determining Lotus.'"2
After recognizing that the case was essentially one of first impression, the
court examined two different cases." Borland urged the court to apply Baker
v. Selden,M arguing that the only difference between the facts and arguments
of Baker and Lotus was the "user interface."1" Unconvinced, the court found
Baker inapplicable." 6 It specifically stated that "this appeal involves Lotus'
monopoly over the commands it uses to operate the computer."" 7
The Lotus court also distinguished Altai from the case before it."'° The
court noted that Altai developed a test to deal with the fact that computer pro-
grams, copyrighted as literary works, can be copied non-literally."3° The First
Circuit recognized that when dealing with a non-literal copying case, a court
must determine whether similarities exist because the works share the same
underlying idea or whether the similarities are a result of the second author
copying the original author's expression."0 The court noted that the Altai test
was developed for such" an inquiry, in the context of computer programs."'
However, the First Circuit reasoned that the Altai test would provide little help
in determining whether the literal copying of Lotus' menu command hierarchy
constituted copyright infringement."' Moreover, it characterized the Altai test
as misleading in this context because "instructing courts to abstract the various
levels... seems to encourage them to find a base [or literal] level that includes
copyrightable subject matter that, if literally copied, would make the copier
liable for copyright infringement."" This type of analysis would obscure the
98. See id.




103. See id. at 813-14.
104. 101 U.S. 99 (1879). See also supra text accompanying notes 47-52.
105. See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 813-14. See also supra text accompanying notes 47-52.
106. See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 814.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 814-15.
109. See id. at 814 (citing Altai, 982 F.2d at 706). Non-literal copying "is copying that is paraphrased or
loosely paraphrased rather than word for word." Id.
110. See id.
111. See id. See also supra notes 83-92 and accompanying text.
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true question of whether the menu command hierarchy as a whole can be copy-
righted."4 Ultimately, the First Circuit refused to apply the Altai test to the
Lotus suit."5 In doing so, it avoided confronting several of the district court's
findings. 116
Without any useful precedent to guide it, the First Circuit went on to dis-
cuss its ultimate finding: Lotus' menu command hierarchy constituted a method
of operation."' Applying section 102,"' the court determined whether the
menu command hierarchy was copyrightable by first asking if the menu com-
mand hierarchy was a "method of operation" as described in section 102(b)." 9
If so, the court reasoned it would be irrelevant whether the menu command
hierarchy fit into one of the categories described in section 102(a).'
Beginning its discussion, the Lotus court conceded that the actual computer
code underlying the menu command was copyrightable.' However, it noted
.that code copying was not at issue; Borland emulated Lotus 1-2-3's menu com-
114. See id. The court stated that "[the initial inquiry should not be whether individual components of a
menu command hierarchy are expressive, but rather whether the menu command hierarchy as a whole can be
copyrighted." Id.
115. See id. While the district court did not literally use the Altai test, it used one that was similar. See
Borland 11, 799 F. Supp. at 211-12. In Borland 11, the district court determined the first two parts of its test
paralleled the abstraction and filtration steps of the Altai test. See id. at 211. Furthermore, the third part of the
district court's test was "compatible substantively though different in methodology" with the "comparison"
portion of the Altai test. See id. at 212.
116. The district court made three conclusions using its test which was similar to that of the Altai test.
See Borland 17, 799 F. Supp at 216-19. First, the district court analyzed the conception of Lotus 1-2-3's user
interface (similar to the abstraction step of the Altai test). See id. at 216. Ultimately, it determined that the
"idea" or "system" of the Lotus 1-2-3 user interface:
involves a system of menus, each menu consisting of less that a dozen commands, arranged hierar-
chically, forming a tree in which the main menu is the root/trunk of the tree and submenus branch off
from higher menus, each submenu being linked to a higher menu by operation of a command, so that
all the specific spreadsheet operations available in Lotus 1-2-3 are accessible through the paths of the
menu command hierarchy.
Id.
Second, the district court determined the menu command hierarchy contained identifiable elements of
expression (similar to the filtration step of the Altai test). See id. at 217. It identified that "[a] very satisfactory
spreadsheet menu tree can be constructed using different commands and a different command structure from
those of Lotus 1-2-3." Id. It found particularly persuasive the fact that Borland indeed did construct such an
alternative tree for use in Quattro Pro. See id.
Finally, the district court looked at the expressive elements from step two in order to see if such ele-
ments taken together consist of a substantial part Lotus 1-2-3's user interface (similar to the comparison step
of the Altai test). See id. at 219. Here, the court determined that the expressive elements of the menu com-
mand hierarchy consisted of a substantial part of Lotus 1-2-3. See id.
117. See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 815-19.
118. See supra note 59.
119. See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 816.
120. See id.
121. See id. They also briefly discussed the copyrightability of Lotus 1-2-3 "long prompts." See id. at
815-16 n.9. In the menu command of Lotus 1-2-3, the computer user sees a two line menu. The top line con-
sists of the command, while the bottom line displays the long prompt. It is similar to help text, describing
what the command will do. See id. at 811 n.2. On one hand the court expressly states that it takes no position
on whether the "long prompt" can be copyrighted. See id. at 815-16 n.9 (citing Morrissey v. Proctor & Gam-
ble Co. 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (lst Cir. 1967)). On the bther hand, in the same footnote the court stated that a
strong argument could be made that the long prompt's explanation merges with the idea of explaining such
function. See id. In citing Morrissey, the court explained that when there are only limited number of ways to
express an idea, the expression merges with the idea and is uncopyrightable. See id. The court also expressly
stated that it would take no position as to whether the Lotus 1-2-3 screen display consists of an original ex-
pression which is capable of being copyrighted. See id. at 816 n.10.
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mand hierarchy without copying any of Lotus 1-2-3's code." Moreover, the
First Circuit reasoned that the phrase "method of operation" within section
102(b) "refers to the means by which a person operates something. '""ra Ulti-
mately, it held that Lotus 1-2-3's menu command hierarchy constituted an
unprotectable "method of operation."'
24
In reaching its holding, the First Circuit also refuted some of the district
court's conclusions.'" Specifically, the district court found that the particular
arrangement of the menu command terms constituted an expression of an
idea.'26 The court of appeals disagreed, reasoning that "methods of operation"
are not limited to abstractions; instead they are "the means by which a user
operates something."'" Furthermore, if specific words are essential to an oper-
ation, they are part of the "method of operation" and are unprotectable"
In an attempt to bolster its finding that "methods of operation" are not
limited to abstractions, the First Circuit sought support from Baker.'29 In Bak-
er, the Supreme Court held that while the expression of an idea could be pro-
tected by copyright, the actual idea could not be protected.'30 Baker also de-
scribed the object of the expression as explanation and the object of the idea as
use.'3 ' In terms of Lotus 1-2-3, the First Circuit reasoned that Lotus wrote its
menu command hierarchy so that people could learn it and use it.'32 Conse-
quently, the court said that it "falls squarely within the prohibition on copyright
protection established in Baker v. Seldon and codified by Congress in
§ 102(b).' '133
In describing how the menu command hierarchy represented a "method of
operation," the Lotus court first compared the menu commands to buttons on a
video cassette recorder ("VCR") 3 4 It emphasized that Lotus 1-2-3 without its
menu commands, just like a VCR without buttons, would be useless. 35 Con-
sequently, the court reasoned that how the buttons are labeled and arranged
does not make them an "expression" of the abstract "method of operation.' 3 6
122. See id. at 816.
123. Id. at 815.
124. See id.





130. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 105 (1879).
131. See id.




136. See id. At this point the court also refuted any argument that the buttons of VCRs differ from the
command terms used in operating a computer program. See id. It reasoned that even though a VCR may fit
into the "sculptural works" category in 17 U.S.C. § 102(a), it must furthermore fit the "useful-article excep-
tion." Specifically, to be copyrightable a sculptural work must be able to be identified separately from and are
capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article. See id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101).
Furthermore, the court said that whatever expression exists from the arrangement of the VCR buttons is irrele-
vant; the buttons cannot exist separately from the VCR. See id. Consequently, a VCR cannot be copyrighted.
See id. Finally, the court concluded that VCR buttons are similar to the command terms of Lotus 1-2-3, and
19971
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The First Circuit also described the program's compatibility with similar
programs. 37 The court found it "absurd" that a user familiar with Lotus 1-2-3
would have to learn an entirely new method of operation when switching to a
similar program.' 8 It said:
The fact that there may be many different ways to operate a computer
program, or even many different ways to operate a computer program
using a set of hierarchically arranged command terms, does not make the
actual method of operation chosen copyrightable; it still functions as a
method for operating the computer and as such is uncopyrightable 39
The Lotus court then discussed its view that an expression which is part of
a "method of operation" cannot be copyrighted."' The court interpreted the
Supreme Court decision of Feist as holding that not all expressions are neces-
sarily copyrightable; but rather, a court must determine whether the expression
is uncopyrightable as defined in section 102(b). 4 '
The court also noted that copyright encourages others to build freely upon
the ideas and information conveyed by a work and that Borland was free to
build on the method of operation Lotus designed.'4 It explained that in most
contexts, however, it is unnecessary to "build" on another's expression because
such an expression can be conveyed in a different manner.'43 The court deter-
mined that in the context of methods of operation, "building" requires disman-
fling also.'"
Finally, the First Circuit conceded that its opinion contradicted courts from
other circuits. 5 It first discussed Autoskill, Inc. v. National Educational Sup-
port Systems, Inc.'" In Autoskill, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed
a similar copyright infringement case. While the defendant argued that the
keying procedure used in a computer program constituted an uncopyrightable
"procedure" or "method of operation," the Tenth Circuit disagreed.'47 The
Lotus court recognized that the Autoskill court held that courts must go beyond
the literal language of section 102(b) and distinguish the idea from the expres-
therefore, the command terms cannot be copyrighted. See id.
137. See id. at 817-18.
138. See id. at 818.
139. Id.
140. See id.
141. See id. The First Circuit explained:
We do-not think that the Court's statement that "copyright assures authors the right to their original
expression" indicates that all expression is necessarily copyrightable; while original expression is
necessary for copyright protection, we do not think that it is alone sufficient. Courts must still inquire
whether original expression falls within one of the categories foreclosed from copyright protection by
§ 102(b), such as being a "method of operation."
Id. (quoting Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991)).
142. See id.
143. See id. The court again makes reference to the doctrine of "merger" of the idea and the expression
when there are only a limited number of ways to express an idea. See id. n.13.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. 994 F.2d 1476 (10th Cir. 1993).
-147. See id. at 1495 n.23.
[Vol. 32:633
14
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 32 [1996], Iss. 3, Art. 13
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol32/iss3/13
LOTUS v. BORLAND
sion to resolve the issue.'" Furthermore, the court in Lotus admitted that the
dicta in Brown Bag Software v. Symantic Corp.149 also contradicted the Lotus
holding. 5' Specifically the Lotus court disagreed with the Brown Bag Soft-
ware court's holding that "menus and keystrokes" may be copyrightable.'
VI. ANALYSIS
The First Circuit's decision to classify the menu command hierarchy as a
method of operation allowed the court to avoid investigating the idea/expression
dichotomy. While the First Circuit's reasoning simplifies the required analysis,
it does not adequately reflect Congress' intent for copyright protection. In fact,
its decision contradicts Congress' intent in enacting section 102(b). Moreover,
the court's reasoning seems to contradict itself. It also fails to follow pertinent
case law. Finally, the policy arguments fail to justify contradicting Congress'
intent in enacting section 102 or prior case law. Therefore, while the First
Circuit's decision simplified the necessary analysis, it was incorrect.
First, the First Circuit disregarded the legislative history leading to the
enactment of section 102. The legislative history behind section 102(b) in its
original 1976 version undisputedly indicates Congress' intent in passing the
statute. 2 Specifically, Congress stated that it did not intend section 102(b) to
enlarge or contract the scope of copyright protection, but rather, to codify the
basic idea/expression dichotomy. 3 Consequently, the First Circuit's all-inclu-
sive classification of Lotus 1-2-3's menu command hierarchy as a "method of
operation" is incorrect. Instead, the court should have first analyzed the menu
command hierarchy in light of the idea/expression dichotomy. Only then should
it have determined what portion of the computer program consists of its "meth-
od of operation."
The First Circuit's decision also contradicts itself. As stated above, the
court first determined that the menu command hierarchy could not receive
copyright protection because it was a "method of operation."'54 Moreover, the
court explicitly stated that once it concluded it was a "method of operation" it
was irrelevant whether any portion of that "method of operation" contains the
148. See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 818-19.
149. 960 F.2d 1465, 1477 (9th Cir. 1992).
150. Lotus, 49 F.3d at 819 n.14.
151. See id. (citing Brown Bag Software, 960 F.2d at 1477).
152. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 57, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5670.
153. See id. The exact language of Pub. L. No. 94-553 is as follows:
Some concern has been expressed lest copyright in computer programs should extend protection
to the methodology or processes adopted by the programmer, rather than merely to the "writing" ex-
pressing his ideas. Section 102(b) is intended, among other things, to make clear that the expression
adopted by the programmer is the copyrightable element in a computer program, and that the actual
processes or methods embodied in the program are not within the scope of the copyright law.
Section 102(b) in no way enlarges or contracts the scope of copyright protection under the pres-
ent law. Its purpose is to restate, in the context of the new single Federal system of copyright, that
the basic dichotomy between expression and idea remains unchanged.
Id. 154. See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 815.
1997]
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programmer's expression.'55 As such, the court essentially determined that
portions of the menu command hierarchy did in fact merge with the
uncopyrightable elements of the computer program.
The problem with classifying all portions of the menu command hierarchy
as a "method of operation" is that it would lead to incorrect copyright results.
Explicitly, the First Circuit acknowledges that the program code of Lotus 1-2-3
is copyrightable.Y6 In differentiating between the program code and the menu
command hierarchy, the First Circuit's decision viewed the menu command
hierarchy as essential to the operation of the program.'57 However, it is also
true that the program code becomes essential to the operation of the computer
programs.'58 As such, the First Circuit's decision fails to explain the differ-
ence between the computer code (a copyrightable element of the computer
program) and the menu command hierarchy (an uncopyrightable element of the
computer program). This reasoning illustrates that a court should not classify
Lotus 1-2-3's menu command hierarchy as a blanket "method of operation."
This point becomes even more evident when looking at other computer
cases. Specifically, in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.,59
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed the question of whether a computer
operating system is copyrightable.W Using the same reasoning as the Lotus
court," one could only conclude that the operating system performs essen-
tially the same function as the Lotus 1-2-3's menu command hierarchy; it
serves as a method of operation for a user to interact with the computer, and
thus, is uncopyrightable. In Apple Computer, the court held otherwise. 162 After
discussing the idea/expression dichotomy, the Apple Computer court refused to
accept the defense that such operating systems are per se uncopyrightable and
recognized that this view was consistent with that of other courts and Con-
gress. " Consequently, the Lotus decision fails to provide adequate copyright
protection for computer companies.
The First Circuit's decision also fails to follow pertinent case law. It deter-
mined that the number of different ways there were to operate a program was
immaterial."' The number of different ways that an author can express an
idea directly affects the merger analysis. For example, in Autoskill, the Tenth
155. See id. at 816.
156. See id.
157. See id. at 817.
158. See Petitioner's Brief at 44-45, Lotus (No. 94-2003).
159. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983).
160. See id. at 1249-54.
161. See discussion supra Part V.
162. See Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1253.
163. See id. In Apple Computer, the court said:
We ... focus on whether the idea is capable of various modes of expression. If other programs can
be written or created which perform the same function as a Apple's operating system program, then
that program is an expression of the idea and hence copyrightable. In essence, this inquiry is no
different than that made to determine whether the expression and idea have merged, which has been
stated to occur where there are no or few other ways of expressing a particular idea.
Id.
164. See supra text accompanying note 139.
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Circuit Court of Appeals emphasized the fact that the trial court did not find
any evidence showing that the idea of the computer program could be expressed
in only one way." Consequently, the Tenth Circuit upheld the lower court's
finding that the expression did not merge with the underlying idea."
Similar facts exist in the present case. In particular, the Lotus trial court
concluded that Borland could have constructed "[a] very satisfactory spread-
sheet menu tree... using different commands and a different command struc-
ture from those of Lotus 1-2-3. "167 Therefore, following the reasoning of
Autoskill, it is clear that the Lotus 1-2-3 menu command hierarchy does not
merge with any uncopyrightable element of the computer program.
Once one determines that a court cannot merely classify the menu com-
mand hierarchy as a "method of operation," it is evident that the district court's
decision provided a superior solution in accordance with precedent. The district
court utilized a test to analyze the copyrightability of a computer program's
non-literal elements substantially similar to that of the Altai test.'68 Although
somewhat different, both tests allowed the court to clearly delineate the copy-
rightable portions of a computer program.'69 Furthermore, the Altai court ex-
plained:
[In devising this test] we are cognizant that computer technology is a
dynamic field which can quickly outpace judicial decisionmaking. Thus,
in cases where the technology in question does not allow for a literal
application of the [Altai test], our opinion should not be read to foreclose
the district courts of our circuit from utilizing a modified version."'
Also, the First Circuit's policy argument does not justify disregarding
Congress' intent for enacting section 102 or relevant case law. Specifically, the
First Circuit found the interest of the user important. 7 ' It determined that a
Lotus 1-2-3 user should not have to learn different menu commands for differ-
ent spreadsheet programs."n However, this reasoning focuses only on one in-
terest of the user. In fact, a computer user may have interests other than the
ease of transition between different spreadsheet programs. For example, a user
may be more interested in the development of better and innovative menu com-
mand hierarchy arrangements. The First Circuit's decision, in effect, stifles a
computer company's incentive to invest time and research into developing a
new, innovative menu command hierarchy. Computer companies will be in-
clined to wait and improve on another company's ideas. As such, the First
165. See Autoskill, 994 F.2d at 1494.
166. See id.
167. Borland II, 799 F. Supp. at 217. Moreover, the trial court held that "[c]hanges in submenus increase
the number of possible menu hierarchies geometrically. Since there are dozens of independent submenus, the
number of possible menu hierarchies is extremely large.' Id. at 217-18.
168. See supra note 115.
169. See supra notes 115, 116 and accompanying text.
170. Altai, 982 F.2d at 706 (emphasis added).
171. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
172. See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 818. Specifically, the court found that forcing the user to learn different com-
mands for different programs "absurd." Id.
1997]
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Circuit created a rule that serves to ease the computer user's transition between
similar programs. Unfortunately, the ultimate effect will be to hinder the inno-
vation of new and better menu command hierarchies.
Furthermore, the First Circuit's decision also erroneously relies on Feist
for support for its policy argument." The court quotes Feist.
The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors,
but to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts. To this end, copy-
right assures authors the right to their original expression, but encourages
others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a
work.1
74
The First Circuit decision concludes that its decision does not violate the Feist
holding." Specifically, it determines that the Feist holding does not indicate
that all expression is necessarily copyrightable. 76 However, the First Circuit
fails to recognize the first portion of the Feist holding: that copyright serves to
promote the progress of science and useful arts. Consequently, it is clear that
the First Circuit's decision fails to accomplish the one thing that would promote
the progress of science and the useful arts; in fact, the decision hinders its prog-
ress. Without copyright protection, computer companies will continue to take
menu command hierarchies from their competitors and not invest the time and
money in developing innovative ideas.
VII. COMPUTER COMPANIES SEEK A SOLUTION
There is a clear split in authority between the different jurisdictions. While
the literal computer code still receives federal copyright protection, the menu
commands may not. As it stands now, the only indicator of whether menu
command hierarchies are protected by copyright is the jurisdiction in which the
suit is brought. If a case is brought within the Tenth Circuit, the court will
clearly provide copyright protection pursuant to Autoskill v. National Education-
al Support Systems." However, if the suit is brought in a court under the
First Circuit, it will not receive similar copyright protection. Rather, it will
merely be viewed as a "method of operation" pursuant to Lotus v. Borland.
In either case, the Supreme Court decision in Lotus v. Borland' has
caused the computer companies to reevaluate whether to continue to seek copy-
right protection for its computer programs. Assuming the Supreme Court deter-
mines the issue important enough to examine again, one can only speculate on
which side of the fence Justice Steven's, or his successor's, vote will land.
173. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
174. Lotus, 49 F.3d at 818 (quoting Feist, 499 U.S. at 349-50).
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
178. 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996).
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Amidst all the uncertainty, attorneys have focused on other ways to protect
their client's software. Commentators suggest that attorneys are returning to
some of the older ways of protecting software by choosing patent and trade
secret protection.179 While these methods of protection have their benefits over
copyright, they also have drawbacks. Specifically, patent protection, unlike
copyright and trade secret protection, guards against independent creation by
other computer programs."w Also, patent law protects against reverse engi-
neering, while copyright does not. 8' However, patent protection lasts only
seventeen years while copyright protection lasts seventy-five years.' Finally,
another drawback of patent protection is that it takes two years to obtain such
protection and in that time the computer program is often technologically obso-
lete."8 Consequently, the uncertainty the Supreme Court left in issuing a split
4-4 vote in Lotus v. Borland will likely remain for the time being.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the First Circuit's decision in Lotus classifies Lotus 1-2-3's
menu command hierarchy as a "method of operation." In doing so, the court
contradicted existing case law. Moreover, the First Circuit relied on federal
copyright statutes; however, in doing so it, ignored Congress' intent in enacting
the statute. That intent was to codify older, court created, copyright protection.
The First Circuit's policy argument fails to advance the primary objective of
copyright law. Specifically, the First Circuit's policy reason is limited to the
concern for the computer user's short term interest of switching between com-
peting computer programs. It does not consider the computer user's long term
interest of receiving new and innovative computer programs. It also does not
consider the interests of the computer companies who hold a copyright.
The subsequent Supreme Court's split decision effectively precludes com-
puter companies from being able to rely on copyright law to protect the non-
literal, menu command hierarchy portion of their computer programs. By failing
to issue an opinion, the lower courts continue to have conflicting law. In the
First Circuit, a computer program's menu command hierarchy is considered a
"method of operation," and thus, it is not afforded copyright protection. Howev-
er, in the Tenth Circuit, the same menu command hierarchy must be analyzed
using the Altai test. Only then can a court in the Tenth Circuit truly know
whether the menu command hierarchy can be afforded copyright protection.
Despite the uncertainties with respect to protecting computer programs,
attorneys have continued to work to protect their clients. However, they have
moved away from copyright law. Instead, they have focused on more traditional
179. See Dominic Bencivenga, Beyond Copyright Law: How to Protect Software, NAT'L LJ., Apr. 22,
1996, at B1.
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intellectual property ideas. Specifically, they are attempting to utilize patent and
trade secret law. These areas of law offer different protection than that given by
copyright. In some instances, they offer more protection; in some instances,
they offer less protection. In either case, it is clear that until the Supreme Court
revisits the same issue in the future, attorneys will have to work with the confu-
sion among the circuits.
Christopher Kanagawa
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